Conference: Shaping EU climate and energy policy

Description:

Contracts for Difference (CfDs) are set to become a mandatory promotion instrument with the electricity market reform. In fact, there have been many attempts at the EU legal level to determine whether CfDs should be used, but few guidelines on how they should be designed. Join our hybrid event to explore the economic and legal dimensions of CfDs, as well as various design options and practical experiences in a round of experts.

Speakers: Johanna Kamm (Stiftung Umweltenergierecht – Foundation for Environmental Energy Law), Dr. Vasilios Anatolitis (Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI), José Elías Cabrera (EU Commission, DG ENER), Conall Heussaff (Bruegel), Pablo del Rio (Spanish National Research Council; online), Alfa Diallo (Regional Center for Energy Policy Research; online)
Dr. Markus Kahles (Moderation; Stiftung Umweltenergierecht – Foundation for Environmental Energy Law)

Key take aways from the organizers:

CfDs are expected to become a mandatory promotion instrument for direct price support schemes with the electricity market reform. As this will be a substantial shift, this interdisciplinary exploration aimed to discern not just “whether” CfDs should be employed but crucially, “how” they should be designed for optimal efficacy. Diverse discussions, both in person and online, contributed to a deeper understanding of the regulatory, design, and implementation aspects of CfDs. The workshop successfully bridged interdisciplinary perspectives, providing actionable insights for policymakers, stakeholders, and industry players. The different opinions on CfD design also showed that there is a need for further investigation and analysis, inter alia regarding the advantages and disadvantages of production-based CfDs vs. production-independent CfDs.

• The promotion of many renewable technologies via direct price support schemes will very likely only be possible via CfDs in the future, but Member States will have significant discretion in design.
• In the design of CfDs, generally there is a trade-off between risk mitigation/hedging and market integration to be considered.
• The “right” choice of CfD could vary greatly depending on the respective situation.

In practice, the incentives for renewable energy projects to enter a CfD bidding process vary greatly. This is due to many different parameters and requires further research and observation.

Description:

Developing renewable energy infrastructure requires space. As a finite resource, various interests in its use must be reconciled. The workshop will discuss which requirements for land use follow from the recent reform of the RED, the Emergency Regulation (2022/2577) and the Nature Restoration Law that is expected to be adopted soon, especially for planning law. What scope for implementation exists for the Member States with regard to land use conflicts and how can and should they be resolved? How do we achieve multifunctional land use that equitably balances different users’ interests as fast as possible?

Speakers: Dr. Matti Gurreck (University of Greifswald, Institute for Energy, Environmental and Maritime Law), Carla Freund (BirdLife Europe/NABU), Laura Sanaz Kaschny (Tilburg University), Kenny Meganck (Institute for European Environmental Policy), Marta Andres Vaquero (EU Commission – DG ENER), Slavitza Dobreva de Schietere & Stefania Charisiadou (EU Commission – DG ENV), Timo Herberg (German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection)

Key take aways from the organizers:

The workshop brought together various stakeholders from the EU Commission and Member State authorities as well civil society, think tanks and researchers. Participants discussed if and to what extent the recent legislative developments at the EU level – such as the reform of the RED, the Emergency Regulation (2022/2577) and the Nature Restoration Law – have managed to reconcile the spatial needs of renewables deployment and nature protection. Several crucial aspects were identified, especially the need for adequate site selection for renewable energies which takes into consideration the ecologic sensitivity of the area in question. This poses challenges to spatial planning at the regional level which requires i.a. reliable mapping tools and sufficient administrative capacities. At the same time, trend-setting decisions at legislative (federal) level are essential. Other relevant aspects are the challenge of integrating large amounts of renewable electricity into the grid, which requires addressing grid expansion at least with the same focus as plant construction, as well as the soft wording of the new nature restoration provisions which risks missing the EU’s targets. Overall, a holistic and cross-sectoral approach is needed to balance competing interests.

Description:

Introduced in 2018, the Governance Regulation acts as the primary mechanism ensuring EU Member States’ adherence to renewable energy and energy efficiency objectives. However, recent revisions to the RED and EED have infused governance provisions into sectoral laws, potentially diluting the Governance Regulation’s central role. A Reform of the Governance Regulation as envisioned by the EU Commission is therefore urgently needed.  How will the new sectoral governance provisions be incorporated into the Governance Regulation? How can we bolster the Governance Regulation to transparently and credibly achieve the 2030 and future 2040 targets? What role does the stakeholder consultation play in the review process? Join our hybrid event to engage with insights from our consortium and participate in a comprehensive discussion.

Speakers: Ronja Busch (Stiftung Umweltenergierecht – Foundation for Environmental Energy Law), Prof. Dr. Michèle Knodt & Nils Bruch (Technical University of Darmstadt), Niels Anger (German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action – BMWK), Guus van de Schouw (EU Commission – DG ENER), Verena Bax (CAN Europe)
Fabian Pause (Moderation; Stiftung Umweltenergierecht – Foundation for Environmental Energy Law)

Key take aways from the organizers:

In the workshop, participants discussed the opportunities of a revised Governance Regulation for achieving the 2030 targets as well as the challenges to develop a more robust framework with a view to the 2040 objectives. All participants agreed that there is a need to maintain the central function as an integrative steering instrument and thus to integrate governance-related provisions from sectoral legislation (REDIII, EED, EPBD) and from the Effort Sharing Regulation into the Governance Regulation. Furthermore, the discussion has shown that more bindingness in combination with increased support for the Member States must be considered. The introduction of stronger enforcement mechanisms, e.g. cross-policy conditionalities, may be one measure to ensure compliance with the Governance Regulation. When integrating new aspects such as the social cushioning of climate change measures, care should be taken to ensure that new planning and reporting obligations e.g. for Social Climate Plans, are harmonized with the NECP process. Finally, greater integration of reporting and alignment with the UNFCCC reporting obligations can keep the administrative burden for Member States within reasonable limits.    

Description:

Since the G7 summit in Elmau, June 2022, initiated by Chancellor Scholz, the concept of a “Climate Club” has become a focal point in global climate discussions. This club, envisioned to expedite industrial decarbonisation, mitigate carbon leakage risks, and foster emissions-reducing measures, offers an avenue to realizing the Paris Climate Agreement. While its objectives are clear, the club’s potential formats vary widely, each with its pros and cons. Join us as we present findings from an Ariadne analysis on the macroeconomic impacts of a Climate Club on German and European economies, exploring which effects the introduction of a climate club in cooperation with different partners and an expansion of their climate protection efforts can have. Engage and discuss our findings with us.

Speakers: Ulrich Fahl & Lena Kittel (Institute for Energy Economics and Rational Energy Use), Jana Nysten (Stiftung Umweltenergierecht – Foundation for Environmental Energy Law), Christian Flachsland (Hertie School)

Key take aways from the organizers:

Climate clubs are one of the beacons of hope for taking the energy transition a decisive step forward and this instrument has increasingly become the focus of public attention. The Climate Club founded at the G7 summit under the German presidency in 2022 now has 36 members. It focuses on accelerating the decarbonization of industry to support the rapid and ambitious implementation of the Paris Climate Agreement. Other approaches to establish a Climate Club based on trade measures (such as CBAMs) and cooperation on technology and finance have also been proposed. Nevertheless, many questions remain unanswered. In addition to legal issues and WTO-compliant implementation, the optimal structure and design of the Climate Club and the economic consequences both at macroeconomic and sectoral level are still unclear. Diverse discussions during the workshop contributed to a deeper understanding of the regulatory, design and implementation-related aspects. However, the open discussion also revealed the many unresolved questions of detail and the potential pitfalls. This allowed interdisciplinary perspectives from the audience to be utilized and new findings to be developed for further research.

Description:

Ariadne project results will be presented and visualised on a web platform which is envisioned to operate on a wiki-based principle, allowing for continuous updates. In this workshop, we aim to engage with potential users to discuss their requirements and identify relevant use cases.

Organisers: Michael Pahle, Sebastian Osorio (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research), Ulrich Fahl (Institute for Energy Economics and Rational Energy Use)

Key take aways from the organizers:

A main risk for any web platform is that it eventually endis up in the “cemetery of web platforms and tools”. The question is thus how to generate value during the project and, at the same time, offer a lasting product that is useful enough to be operated and maintained even after the end of the project. A key aspect of the platform’s longevity is the creation of content that is useful to the members of the consortium for their scientific work in the project.

In that vein it was decided that the platform would have three main sections:

• Policy FAQ: Researchers often face difficulties in incorporating the latest policies and regulations in their work. The way they are implemented in quantitative research and in particular the consideration of their technical details ultimately might have a strong impact on the modelling results. These are issues that take a lot of time to understand and put things together (e.g., compiling information from different sources, and having an exchange with stakeholders). An example is how the Total Number of Allowances in Circulation (TNAC) is calculated and other details of the Market Stability Reserve (MSR) operation. This section would be a suitable information source for those who want to be informed about these issues and have little time.
• Paper showroom: This section has the aim to make scientific papers more accessible to a broad readership. The section shall contain blog-type pieces on the paper (“exhibits”), including the option of adding some curated figures that could attract more readers to the paper. Additionally, each paper’s subsection would contain related material, e.g., slides from conferences where it has been presented.
• Modellers’ hub: This section shall be dedicated to input data that is frequently used in energy-system models. The value lies in centralizing information that is typically sparse. This already entails a value for the modellers within and outside of the project. Besides presenting different data sources with some details regarding the geographic, time and technology/sectoral granularity, it describes the data and comment on the main pros and cons of using it. Correspondingly, this section is also curated and not meant to be a laundry list of links.

An additional section that still needs more discussion is a potential policy dashboard. This would provide an overview of certain policies, e.g. climate legislation map in Germany. Here information from different sources would be compiled and serve as entry point for different stakeholders and modellers. Depending on the policy, it could be combined with the modellers’ hub.

The overall strategy for the platform is to start small and keep adding content progressively, by strating with the material we use and not search for new information. For instance, in the modellers’ hub, we would start only with data sources that we currently use. In order to provide a good experience for visitors of the webpage and get them interested in additional content, all information should be cross-linked.

Description:

Over the past years, surveys have gained importance in informing climate policy making and debates. They provide relevant information on the public’s policy preferences and attitudes, in particular regarding the support for different measures and instruments. Additionally, they offer the opportunity to investigate causal claims by using experimental variations, and offer the opportunity to test the effects of communication strategies or information provision on citizens’ attitudes. In this event we present selected recent surveys, discuss implied policy arguments and uses cases, and aim to answer the question which role such surveys can and should play for the next wave of EU climate policy amidst concerns about a potential “greenlash”.

Speakers: Michael Pahle (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research), Mario Scharfbillig (EC – Joint Research Center), Rory Fitzgerald (University of London, Director of the European Social Survey, Grischa Perino (Uni Hamburg)

Key take aways from the organizers:

A starting point of the discussion was the observation that survey results seem to be used much more in politics (communication) than in policy (development & design). Several potential reasons were brought up that suggest the existence of such a “use bias”:

• Survey (poll) results are not only used to elicits opinions and attitudes (potential inputs to policy design), but also to drive them. This use case may have strong(er) appeal. Moreover, use of surveys to this end might be more frequent because they do not need to meet high methodological standards (faster and easier to design) and are cheaper (especially when conducted by market research firms).
• Related, there may be reservations or misconceptions about the value of using surveys and their methodological quality. Potential “policy users” may have little knowledge about what actually can be learned from surveys. Furthermore, trust in findings might be low because of the seemingly prevalent use to drive opinion (see above) that gives the method a “bad name”. Finally, eliciting attitudes towards exiting policies faces the challenge of measuring “symbolic vs. true” opposition to policy; symbolic in the sense that respondents may oppose party/politicians and their overall policy agenda, and not necessarily the specific policy in question. This is hard to disentangle.
• In addition, surveys seem to be more useful for some policy problems than for others. In particular policy problem that focus on beliefs/attitudes (rather than behaviour) and are of medium complexity match survey methodology well.
• Finally, there is a problem of matching supply and demand. Scientific research has long time frames and often focus on novelty, which tends to be conflicting with policymaker need for robustness, descriptive results, country differences etc. Besides, scientists might simply be interested in questions that are of little immediate policy relevance.

These (potential) reasons also hint to ways for improving the use of survey results for policy making. Specific pathways for doing so have already been described in a report on the impact of the European Social Survey. In the workshop, the following options were identified:

• Scientists should establish and raise awareness for quality standards in surveys used for policy advice, and explain why they are important and how they could provide real value added. For example, they could help to understand the “true” values of citizens, the arguments they employ, and thus shed light on the “real” lines of conflict (which may differ from what policy makers perceive). They could also identify dangerous “trigger points” for public opposition, especially if they play only a small role for policy. One example that was brought up is the cargo bike: proposed policy to support it created societal pushback highly disproportional to its role for the energy transition (compared to e.g. heat pumps).
• Related, ideally policy makers should develop policy design and communication in parallel. It was stated that there seems to be demand for corresponding research, or at least awareness about the crucial role of being able to communicate policy properly. While general guidance is already available, e.g. on how to communicate carbon pricing, there is a need that scientists align their survey research more with policy agenda to have impact.
• Better use for policy makers notwithstanding, care should be taken to ensure survey questions remain accessible to the target population (often the general public). There is a tendency for policy makers to try and ask about issues in policy language or using policy jargon. This is sometimes poorly understood by respondents leading to unreliable data.

Description:

Join a collaborative session bringing together academic modelers and market analysts to discuss the functioning of the MSR – with a view on its upcoming review in 2026. Building on a session last year, we will first go through the main updates and then deep dive into the results for the evolution of the TNAC and the operation of the MSR. The focus of the model-based discussion will be the years until 2030, but we will also consider effects post 2030 in the discussion if they may impact MSR behaviour in this decade.

Speakers: Analysts from ICIS, Refinitiv, Veyt, BNEF and scientists from PIK, CAKE/KOBICZE, Enerdata

Key take aways from the organizers:

Description:

The inclusion of negative emissions (CDR) in the ETS has sparked significant debate. When, what, and how exactly to do it? While various general proposals have been presented, the sequence and integration of institutional steps remain unclear. Join our hybrid event as we lay out and discuss various ideas for incorporating CDR into the ETS framework.

Speakers: Michael Pahle & Darius Sultani (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research), Artur Runge-Metzger (Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change), Bjarne Steffen (ETH Zürich), Verena Hofbauer (Carbon Gap)

Key take aways from the organizers:

• Developing and implementing a regulatory framework for scaling up carbon dioxide removals (CDR) can be thought of in a narrow vision (first steps of integration into existing framework) and a broad vision (long term institutions under consideration of wider ramifications). Proper sequencing is essential to ensure that both align with each other, i.e. first steps are conducive and eventually lead to the required long-term institutions.
• The broad vision starts from the objective of the EU to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, net negative thereafter. Establishing carbon removals as a new pillar of EU climate governance is the logical next step of fulfilling the obligations set out by the EU Climate Law. This likely requires a dedicated proactive industrial policy, and also considerations of economy-wide and trade effects, and conflation with other policy domains.
  • First of all, the broader vision should consider permanent and non-permanent CDR alike. While integrating non-permanent CDR into the EU climate policy architecture is more challenging due to liability and integrity risks, its technoeconomic potential may be higher than that of permanent CDR (cp. ESABCC 2023). To deal with the risks, a dedicated European Carbon Central Bank with an according narrow mandate might be a suitable governance approach.
  • Specifically, for BECCS, the broad vision needs to consider potential relocation of emission reductions to outside EU, looking at supply chain emissions, and creating a broader incentive structure for the use of biomass, which eventually trickles down to forester.
  • Specifically, for DACCS, the broad vision needs to consider worldwide deployment and corresponding technological learning, as well as cooperation to that end with e.g. the US.
• The narrow vision starts from existing policies, and integration of permanent CDR into the EU ETS seems a straight forward option. ETS could facilitate early (technological and methodological) learning in the removal sector (while maintaining abatement incentives), and help providing financial incentives.
  • Specifically, for DACCS, a first wave of DACCS projects is being realised through funding from voluntary carbon markets (mostly outside of the EU). However, a new wave of momentum is needed for scale-up. The perspective of a pathway for inclusion in a compliance market could lead to such a new wave, and installations also in the EU.
  • Specifically, for BECCS, biomass already covered under the ETS could be integrated, i.e. being accounted for as carbon removals. Already existing regulation and certification, notably of sustainability criteria, needs to be considered.
  • Besides, the door should be left open for further technologies besides BECSS and DACCS that meet the same criteria, in particular permanence and MRV-ability.
  • Integration could also help overcoming potential liquidity problem in the ETS post 2030. This could either be accomplished through direct integration, or through creating a reserve of credible/permanent CDR credits simultaneously that may later on be drip-fed into the ETS if beneficial from an overall efficiency. Alternatively, credits cold be stored to achieve net negative emissions (i.e. following “parallel processes”).
  • Overall, the purpose of integration should be well defined and ultimately relate to achieving the overall objective of achieving long-term climate targets at lowest costs, i.e. ensuring integrity and efficiency (see above). Doing so could resolve controversies about what is the core-benefit and what is the co-benefit of integration, i.e. helping the ETS vs. helping CDR.
  • Scaling up CDR not only relies on immediate financial incentives, but also on the expectations about prospective future incentives. Early signalling of inclusion intended at a later stage could be instrumental for shaping according expectations. For instance, the next revision of the ETS could include a time line for the inclusion, e.g. a certain amount to be included form a given year on post-2030 – in similar vein as the signalled intent to link the ETS and ETS2 after 2031.
  • An open question is to which design choices to commit early on (specific year? volume to be integrated?), and where to retain flexibility to be able to react to future developments and new knowledge.

Description:

Under the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR), EU Member States must achieve GHG reduction targets in sectors beyond the primary EU trading system (ETS I). As a result, many have introduced tools such as national carbon taxes. With the upcoming EU trading system for buildings and transport (ETS II), these tools might coexist due to ESR obligations. The revamped ETS also brings stricter rules regarding the use of ETS revenues: How to ensure that this money is used to enhance social acceptability and support decarbonisation efforts? Join our hybrid workshop where we present our research findings on the topic and delve into the legal dynamics of these coexisting instruments. We’ll discuss Member States’ discretion in designing national carbon pricing within the EU ETS II framework and the legalities of using ETS and potential national CO2 pricing revenues.

Speakers: Jana Nysten & Ronja Busch (Stiftung Umweltenergierecht – Foundation for Environmental Energy Law), Michael Pahle (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research), Jan Nill (EU Commission – DG CLIMA), James Collis (Citizens’ Climate Europe), Luke Hayword (European Environmental Bureau), Dr. Claudia Kettner-Marx (Austrian Institute for Economic Research (Wifo))
Fabian Pause (Moderation; Stiftung Umweltenergierecht – Foundation for Environmental Energy Law)

Key take aways from the organizers:

With the introduction of the new EU ETS 2 for road transport and buildings, the EU established a new instrument to help achieve the Member States national GHG emission reduction targets under the Effort Sharing Regulation. The workshop discussed the interaction between this new ETS 2 and existing or potential new national carbon pricing instruments. The discussion showed that a coexistence would be allowed under EU law, and could make sense economically in certain cases. The participants emphasised that the future price level of the ETS 2 is highly uncertain and depends mainly on additional measures and technological progress in the areas covered by the ETS 2. The participants also discussed the related question of the use of revenues from carbon pricing instruments like the ETS 2, based on an analysis of the legal framework set out in the ETS Directive and experiences from Member States.

Description:

This Foresight Workshop will develop scenarios to map how the European Green Deal could evolve in the next legislative period. The scenarios will reflect different fundamental drivers that have the capacity to shift the EU’s climate and energy discourse and therefore the policies adopted. Such drivers could include a) renewed attention to economic dynamic and international competitiveness, b) heightened concerns about security of Europe‘s energy supply and geopolitical autonomy, c) social equity and distributional concerns, and d) renewed ambition for transformative climate policy in the light of the escalating climate crisis.

Speakers and Moderators: Benjamin Görlach, Matthias Duwe (Ecologic Institute), Anthony Cox (Independent Consultant & Senior Policy Advisor Ecologic Institute), Ronja Busch (Stiftung Umweltenergierecht – Foundation for Environmental Energy Law)

Key take aways from the organizers:

In this foresight exercise, groups discussed potential futures for the European Green Deal for four scenarios, reflecting different fundamental drivers and shifting political priorities 1) revitalisation of the EU economy through deregulation and private as well as public investment; 2) security and strategic autonomy, with a strong emphasis on reducing dependence on third countries and vulnerability of supply chains; 3) equity, social fairness and inclusion, with emphasis on job creation and redistribution, and 4) sustainable welfare within planetary boundaries, involving elements of sufficiency and environmental justice. Discussions found that scenarios were only partly commensurate with transformative climate and energy policy, and that each involved substantial risks for the EU to remain on track towars its climate goals.The concluding discussion identified several areas where action would be needed across all scenarios. These included (1) the external dimension of the European Green Deal, in particular trade policy, but also climate diplomacy and partnerships (2) active industrial policy – albeit taking different forms and following different objectives under the four scenarios, and (3) the increasing integration of climate policies with other policy areas (trade, security, social and labour market policies). The discussion also identified key risks and red lines, among them funding – with an increasing risk that ETS revenue (which is already contested for different types of transition funding) is repurposed for other goals. Another cross-cutting risk are trade-offs between climate goals against non-climate environmental objectives, in particular biodiversity.

Description:

With more stringent climate policies and higher energy prices it has become clear that supporting vulnerable groups will be of the essence. The creation of the Social Climate Fund spearheaded this discussion on the EU level, established criteria and is now prompting implementation in EU member states. In this event we will discuss what role science can play to support this process, and which research is needed beyond “traditional” distributional impact analysis that informed the first wave of the debate. The focus of the discussion will be targeted social compensation and the identification of vulnerability, which have already emerged as key topics.

Speakers: Michael Pahle & Christopher Leisinger (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research), Thomas Douenne (University of Amsterdam), Mihnea Cătuți (E3G Romania), Katja Schumacher (Öko-Institut), Frank Siebern-Thomas (DG EMPL), Eva Srnová (DG ENERGY), Lennart Stern (PIK)

Key take aways from the organizers:

• Overall, there is a strong need to harvest knowledge and data on vulnerabilities to carbon pricing. Science and policymaker should move beyond traditional distributional impact assessments and strive for closer collaboration to collect and address open questions and issues. This pertain normative question related to the overall approach, and practical questions related to implementation.
  • On the normative level, questions include whom can we compensate, whom we want to compensate, and whether we should actually try to compensate everyone. Two aspects emerged that could help finding answers: (1) It seems useful to acknowledge the double-character of related fairness principles (e.g. “leaving no one behind”); they can either express general aspirations of what would normatively be desirable to achieve, or serves as guiding principles for designing climate policies in a fair(er) way. (2) Related, employing welfare theory could help identifying properly grounded indicators. For example, it seems not straight forward to make a case for using energy poverty as an indicator that justifies (social) intervention.
  • On the practical level, questions include how to identify vulnerable groups, trade-offs between exact targeting and administrative costs, and more broadly how to garner public support for climate policies. The discussion brought up a number of issues to consider, including: (1) In light of the difficulty of identifying in particular horizontal distributional impacts, “discovery mechanisms” could be used through which households could reveal their type, i.e. if they belong to the targeted group. However, this need to consider potential barriers to accessing and understanding such programs, which seem to be widespread in potential target groups. (2) Overall there is need for a more granular evidence base, and long-term modelling that better integrates behavioural feedback loops. (3) Proposals are needed how to help groups that cannot (fully) make mitigation decisions themselves, notably tenants, and also how to define and set milestones in order to measure progress. (4) Cooperation with researchers working on social policy is commendable to overcome the barriers to the conception and design of truly integrated climate and social policies.
• Furthermore, against the backdrop of the energy crisis and a potential upcoming “green lash”, several issues related to the new EU mechanisms and cooperation and coordination between the EU and its member states came up.
  • Social compensation entails the risks that vulnerabilities are simply cushioned, but not alleviated. This suggest a dynamic sequencing approach (i.e. identification –> prevention –> compensation –> identification –> …) to attain a just transition. In fact, such an approach is embedded in the criteria for using ETSII revenues (through the SCF and otherwise). That is, they should address the roots of vulnerability (i.e. prevent and alleviate vulnerabilities) rather than simply buying vulnerable groups out (e.g. direct income support).Carbon pricing (ETSII) and SCF are connected to the EU’s Pillars of Social Rights. The SCF cannot address all regressive effects of decarbonizing, is not designed to do so and should not be considered the only tool in place. Moreover, member states have an important role to play because social policy and transfer systems is in their responsibility. Related, vulnerability needs to be understood from various angles and perspectives and there is no “one-fits-all” indicator to identify vulnerable groups. Hence, MS are central actors deliver on social climate plan (SCP) implementation and directed ETSII revenue spending, and the SCF also plays an important motivating role for MS to start dealing with and working on this topic. Addressing vulnerabilities requires exchange of knowledge and cooperation between different administrative levels (EU, MS, regions). MS and regions in general know conditions and priorities for vulnerability best, but voice demand for technical and administrative support. Administrative support by the EC to set up SCPs is a great help for Central-Eastern EU MS. However, “outsourcing” of knowledge to consultants might hamper incentives for building up own capacities (MS should build up own capacities to identify and address vulnerable groups in different contexts).